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The Brazilian Appellate Procedure
through Common Law Lenses: How
American Standards of Review May Help
Improve Brazilian Civil Procedure
Cesar Zucatti Pritsch*
In this article, I discuss a flaw in Brazilian civil procedure
observed in my practice as a Federal Labor Judge in Brazil,
an issue that may be addressed by limiting appellate review
in a similar fashion as the American courts do, using standards of appellate review. In Brazil, appellate courts tend to
ignore the lower court’s decisions, replacing them for the
ruling they would have made had they been the original decision makers. A simple disagreement with the lower court’s
findings of fact or discretionary rulings, no matter how reasonable, is sufficient grounds for reversal. The lack of standards of review results in duplication of the trial court’s work
at the appellate level, and provides excessive incentives for
the parties to appeal. Parties often gamble for a different
judgment, given the high odds of reversal that result from the
lack of deferential standards of review. With such restrictive
standards, the quantity and processing time of appeals
would likely decline, relieving the overburdened Brazilian
courts. The introduction of standards of review in Brazil
would not face legal impediments. They are consistent with
*

Cesar Zucatti Pritsch is a Federal Judge for the labor courts of Brazil—Tribunal
Regional do Trabalho da 4a Regiao. The author would like to thank Professor
Mathew Mirow, of Florida International University College of Law, for reviewing
this article. All Portuguese language terms and materials referenced were freely
translated to English by the author.
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constitutional due process guarantees, such as the reasonable duration of process, and with the recent statutory reforms that limit the types and scope of appeals, and
strengthen precedents. Additionally, the lack of an express
statutory basis does not prevent Brazilian courts from performing a more deferential appellate review, notwithstanding the desirability of a nationally binding statute or court
regulation, to achieve consistency. Changes in legal culture,
such as the long-standing unrestricted appellate review in
Brazil, are not easy, but the resulting flood of often trivial
appeals impose a change in that paradigm.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
The standards of appellate review may help improve Brazilian
civil procedure, by reducing the quantity and processing time of appeals, and by relieving the overburdened Brazilian courts. In Brazil,
appellate courts tend to ignore the lower court’s decisions, replacing
them for the ruling they would have made had they been the original
decision makers.1 They do not defer to the trial judge’s decision.2 A
simple disagreement in relation to the findings of fact, the application of the law to the facts, or discretionary rulings by the lower
court—no matter how reasonable those were—is sufficient for an
appellate panel to reverse them.3 Such a situation provides excessive
incentives for the parties to appeal.4 Parties often gamble for a different judgment, given the high odds of reversal.5 Unrestricted appellate review also makes the Brazilian judicial procedure less efficient. Appellate judges repeat the work of the first instance courts,
despite lacking the benefit of the immediate contact with the evidence and with the realities of the trial court.6 The use of more deferential standards to review the fact-findings, the application of law
to facts, and the discretionary rulings of the trial courts, as done in
1
Welber Barral & Rafel Bicca Machado, Civil Procedure and Arbitration,
in INTRODUCTION TO BRAZILIAN LAW 195 (Fabiano Deffenti & Welber Barral
eds., 2011).
2
See generally Ben-Hur Silveira Claus et al., A Função Revisora dos
Tribunais: A Questão do Método no Julgamento dos Recursos de Natureza
Ordinária [The Appellate Courts’ Revising Function: A Question of Method in
the Judgment of Ordinary Appeals], in 6 REVISTA DO TRIBUNAL REGIONAL DO
TRABALHO DA 14ª REGIÃO [14TH REGIONAL LABOR COURT L. REV.] 161 (2010)
(Braz.), available at http://legado.trt14.jus.br/Documentos/Revista_TRT14_2010
_n1.pdf.
3
See generally Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 193-99.
4
Id. at 193 (stating that “appeals are used too often”).
5
Id.
6
Id. at 195.
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the American appellate courts, could help make Brazilian civil procedure faster, with a more efficient distribution of power between
appellate and trial courts.7
In this article, I discuss an issue observed in my practice as a
Federal Labor Judge (Juiz do Trabalho) in Brazil, which is common
not only to the specialized civil procedure applied in the federal labor courts (Justiça do Trabalho), but also to the procedure of all
civil jurisdiction Brazilian courts. We will first discuss the Brazilian
law and scholarship, showing the lack of appellate standards of review in civil procedure. We will examine the unrestricted reviewing
power of the appellate courts and its consequences, such as the excessive rate of appeals and the disregard of trial courts’ decisions,
resulting in duplicative work, delay, and decrease in quality of adjudication. We will propose that the American standards of review
serve as an inspiration for the Brazilian appellate procedure, in order
to improve speed, simplicity, and efficiency. We will then discuss
the operation of these standards in reviewing conclusions of law,
findings of fact, discretionary rulings, and mixed questions of law
and fact. Finally, we intend to examine the applicability of those
standards to Brazilian law, assessing whether they would face any
constitutional or legal impediment, and whether their implementation would actually require a statutory change.
This policy article provides a window into Brazilian civil procedure, its problems, and the efforts to overcome them through judicial
reforms aided by comparative law. It is consistent with the trend of
approximation between the civil law and common law traditions.
This article’s goal is not to exhaust this intricate and sensitive theme,
but only to raise awareness about it, contributing to the ongoing discussion about procedural law reform in Brazil.8
7

See generally Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of
Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 235-42 (2009) (discussing
the problems that the American standards of appellate review are designed to address, which are analogous to the ones that the Brazilian justice system has to
solve in order to improve appellate review).
8
Several reforms have been made in the last two decades to simplify appellate procedure, reducing the number of appeals and strengthening precedent,
which have now been consolidated and extended in the new Code of Civil Procedure, enacted in 2015 and effective in March of 2016. See infra notes 171-79 and
accompanying text.
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THE CURRENT UNRESTRICTED BRAZILIAN APPELLATE
REVIEW AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

A.
Brazilian civil procedure does not limit appellate courts’
power to review the decisions below
In Brazilian civil procedure there are no juries, all findings of
fact and law are made by judges.9 The losing party may appeal as of
right, and the appellate courts review de novo both law and facts.10
Appellate courts tend to ignore the lower judge’s decisions, replacing them for the ruling they would have made if they were in the
trial judge’s position.11 There is no law imposing standards of review or deference to discretionary rulings or fact-findings of the
lower courts.12
The civil procedure applied in federal and state courts is governed by the national Code of Civil Procedure (Código de Processo
Civil, hereinafter C.P.C.) and some non-codified federal statutes.13
A special summary version of civil procedure (labor procedure) is
applied by the federal Labor Justice (Justiça do Trabalho) to labor
and employment cases. The Consolidation of Labor Laws (Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho, hereinafter C.L.T.) contains the core
provisions of labor procedure, which are supplemented by the rules
of the common civil procedure.14

9
Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil, in 1 LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: A
POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 191 (Herbert M. Kritzer ed.,
2002). For questions of fact that require technical knowledge, the judge uses the
help of a court nominated expert (perito), who will submit a written statement and
usually will not testify in a hearing. Each party may also produce their own expert
statement (assistente técnico) to corroborate or rebut the court expert’s statement.
See CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] arts. 156,
465 (2015) (Braz.).
10
Rosenn, supra note 9, at 191.
11
Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 193.
12
Id.
13
See generally C.P.C., supra note 9.
14
CONSOLIDAÇÃO DAS LEIS DO TRABALHO [C.L.T.] [CONSOLIDATION OF
LABOR LAWS], art. 769.
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In Brazil, an appeal will generally have two effects,15 the reviewing effect (efeito devolutivo), which means the resubmission of the
appealed issues to the judiciary,16 and the staying effect (efeito suspensivo), which prevents the enforcement of the judgment until the
appeal is decided.17 Although civil appellate review is limited to the
issues raised by the appellant, the powers derived from the reviewing effect are quite broad.18 The court’s adjudicatory power over the
appealed issues is not limited to what is expressly argued in the appellate briefs, but extends to all questions related to the matter.19 The
appellate court may decide all questions and arguments raised in the
proceeding below, even if they were not completely decided by the
trial court or transcribed in the briefs.20 Additionally, when a claim
or defense is supported by more than one argument and the trial
court rules favorably based on only one of them, the appellate court
may review the other arguments.21 Finally, in the name of expediency, recent reforms have further broadened these powers of the appellate courts.22 When reversing a trial court’s order that dismissed
a claim without adjudication on the merits, the appellate court may
proceed to a first-hand ruling on the merits, without first remanding
to the trial court—as long as it is a question of law or the case is
ready (“ripe”) for immediate adjudication.23
15

C.P.C., art. 1012. See Welber Barral & Rafael Bicca Machado, Civil Procedure and Arbitration, in INTRODUCTION TO BRAZILIAN LAW 183, 195 (Fabiano
Defenti & Welber Barral eds., 2011).
16
C.P.C., art. 1013.
17
See Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 195. In the labor appellate procedure, the staying effect is exceptional. C.L.T., art. 899.
18
C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 1002.
19
3 MOACYR AMARAL SANTOS, PRIMEIRAS LINHAS DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL
CIVIL [PRIMER ON CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW] 110 (7th ed. 1984) (Braz.).
20
C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 1013 § 1.
21
Id. at § 2.
22
See Keith S. Rosenn, Civil Procedure in Brazil, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 487,
488 (1986).
23
C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 1013 § 3. The case is ready for immediate adjudication if the controversy is only a question of law or if it involves questions
of law and fact capable of being proved by the evidence already produced to the
records, without the need of further discovery or hearings. This is usually referred
to as the ripe case theory (teoria da causa madura), and is very similar to the
situation that triggers summary judgment in Brazilian civil procedure. See id. at
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Neither the general jurisdiction civil courts nor the labor courts
use standards that limit appellate review or that give deference to the
decision of the court below. 24 Both the C.P.C. and the C.L.T. are
silent in that matter.25 The decision of the appellate court simply replaces the decision of the lower court below as to the issues on appeal, to which the appellate court has full adjudicatory power, as if
it were the trial judge.26 With equal powers to those that the trial
court had when originally ruling, the appellate court decides both
procedural issues (errores in procedendo) and on the merits (errores
in iudicando).27 This ample review permits the appellant to raise the
illegality or unfairness of the decision below.28 It also allows the
appellate court to revisit all the evidence and findings of fact, and to
either vacate or reform the decision.29 The appellate court does not
consider the findings of fact or law below as presumptively correct.30 Since the entire record is in writing, and since additional evidence on appeal may be admitted only in case of force majeure,31
the appellate court tends to consider itself in as good a position as
the trial judge to weigh the evidence, disregarding the importance of
the witnesses’ demeanor.32

art. 355. See ARRUDA ALVIM, ARAKEN DE ASSIS & EDUARDO ARRUDA ALVIN,
COMENTÁRIOS AO CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [COMMENTS TO THE CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE] 1150 (2d ed. 2012) (Braz.).
24
See Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 193.
25
See generally, C.P.C., supra note 9; C.L.T., supra note 14.
26
C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 1008.
27
SANTOS, supra note 19, at 112.
28
See Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 194-97.
29
NELSON NERY JUNIOR & ROSA MARIA DE ANDRADE NERY, CÓDIGO DE
PROCESSO CIVIL COMENTADO [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED] 887,
893 (11th ed. 2010) (Braz.). See also CARLOS HENRIQUE BEZERRA LEITE, CURSO
DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL DO TRABALHO [COURSE OF LABOR PROCEDURAL LAW]
565 (3d ed. 2005) (Braz.); MAURO SCHIAVI, MANUAL DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL
DO TRABALHO [MANUAL OF LABOR PROCEDURAL LAW] 804 (7th ed. 2014)
(Braz.).
30
Rosenn, supra note 22, at 508.
31
C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 1014.
32
See Rosenn, supra note 22, at 508.
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Even with the new C.P.C. recently passed by the Brazilian Congress and submitted to the President for final approval,33 (to be in
effect after one year), the imposition of stricter standards of appellate review is not one of the projected changes. The new code repeats
the pertinent language of the current C.P.C.34
Despite many recent procedural reforms, Brazilian appellate review is still within the civil law pattern.35 The lack of deference to
the findings of the court below is not exclusive to Brazil. It is a typical feature of civil law jurisdictions, where the decision of the reviewing court generally replaces that of the lower court, instead of

33
The project was approved in the Senate, Projeto de Lei do Senado (PLS)
166 (Braz. 2010), received amendments by the House of Representatives, Projeto
de Lei da Câmara dos Deputados (PLC) 8046 (Braz. 2010), returned to the Senate,
and was then sent to the President for approval on February 13, 2015. See
SUBSTITUTIVO DA CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS nº 166, de 2010, AO PLS nº
166, de 2010 – CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL, SENADO FEDERAL, http://www
.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p_cod_mate=116731 (last visited
Mar. 9, 2017) (illustrating the legislative history of Senate Bill 166) . See also
Kelly Buchanan, FALQs: New Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS (Sept. 1, 2015), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2015/0/falqs-new-braziliancode-of-civil-procedure/.
34
See the comparative table with the provisions of the current code compared
to the versions of both chambers of Brazilian Congress and the final version approved. The project was approved in the Senate, Projeto de Lei do Senado (PLS)
166 (2010) (Braz.), received amendments by the House of Representatives, Projeto de Lei da Câmara dos Deputados (PLC) 8046 (2010) (Braz.), returned to the
Senate and was sent to the President for approval on 2/13/2015. Quadro
comparative do Código Processo Civil Projecto de Lei do Senado no 166, de 2010,
SENADO FEDERAL, http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p_c
od_mate=116731 (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).
See also Senado Federal [Brazilian Senate], Novo CPC: mudanças que buscam
agilizar processo entram na reta final para sanção [New CPC: changes that seek
to streamline process enter the final stretch for sanction], SENADO NOTICIAS, http
://www12.senado.gov.br/noticias/materias/2015/02/13/novo-cpc-mudancas-quebuscam-agilizar-processo-entram-na-reta-final-para-sancao (last updated July 22,
2015).
35
See generally Rosenn, supra note 22. See also infra notes 171-79 (discussing recent reforms that brought Brazil many steps closer to the common law tradition, but not involving standards of review).
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remanding for further proceedings.36 Rather than being primarily a
method of correcting mistakes of law—as in common law jurisdictions—in the civil law tradition appeals are usually considered a
right, which includes the mere reconsideration of factual and legal
issues.37 In a civil law jurisdiction, an appellate court is generally
expected to reexamine all the evidence and independently reach its
own conclusion about the truth of the facts and their legal significance.38
B.
Consequences of the unrestricted scope of appellate review
in Brazil
In Brazil, appeals are used excessively, burdening the entire system.39 The vast majority of the trial courts’ orders are appealed,
causing appellate judges to be overwhelmed by the sheer number of
cases they have to decide every year, as the following statistics illustrate:40

36

Peter E. Herzog & Delmar Karlen, Attacks on Judicial Decisions, in 16
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, CIVIL PROCEDURE ch.8
¶ 3 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1982).
37
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION 121 (3d ed. 2007)
38
Id.
39
When Less is More, THE ECONOMIST (May 21, 2009), http://www.economist.ecom/node/13707663 (explaining that the reason why Brazil’s courts are the
most overburdened is due to the limitless right to appeal).
40
CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA [NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE],
JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA DO TRABALHO [THE JUDICIARY IN NUMBERS
2013: LABOR JUSTICE] 111, 117, 120, 240, 249 (2014) (Braz.); CONSELHO
NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA [NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE], JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS
2013: JUSTIÇA FEDERAL [THE JUDICIARY IN NUMBERS 2013: FEDERAL JUSTICE]
87, 91, 93, 99, 183, 187 (2014) (Braz.); CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA
[NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE], JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA
ESTADUAL [THE JUDICIARY IN NUMBERS 2013: STATE JUSTICE] 121, 115, 130,
136, 139, 274, 280 (2014) (Braz.), available at http://www.cnj.jus.br/images/prog
ramas/justica-em-numeros/jn2014_completo.zip. See also Barral & Machado,
supra note 1, at 193.
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Appeals Against Brazilian Trial
Court Decisions - 2013
Rate of External Appeals from Trial Court
Decisions
Success Rate of Appeals from Trial Court
Decisions
New Cases per Appellate Judge
Total Workload per Appellate Judge (including cases pending from previous years)
Total Appeals Decided
Total Appeals Filed
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Labor Justice

Federal
Justice

State Justice

69.1%

18.9%

8.4%

52.5%

39.5%

36.2%

1,226

3,726

1,294

2,119

12,619

2,712

642,760
648,478

469,174
499,244

2,122,148
2,098,490

As to the Labor Justice, more than two thirds of the trial court
orders are appealed.41 The odds are high for at least a partial reversal
of the decision below, 52.5%.42 On the plaintiffs’ side, that adds up
a very strong incentive to appeal, along with the fact that most of the
plaintiffs are exempted from judicial costs,43 and that they usually
retain their attorneys on a contingency fee basis.44 Thus, plaintiffs at
the Labor Justice have good chances of improving their positions on
appeal at almost no cost, a perfect combination to allow excessive
and sometimes meritless appeals. On the other hand, employers—
the typical defendants before the Labor Justice—do not fit the costs
exemption rule, they must deposit a bond of approximately $ 3,000
(that goes towards payment in case the judgment is affirmed) and
they pay their attorney’s fees during the litigation.45 Experience
41

JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA DO TRABALHO, supra note 40, at 240.
Id. at 249.
43
Mostly, they have lost their jobs and have no income or earn low wages,
fitting the poverty requirement for the exemption (justiça gratuita). See CNJ
Serviço: quem tem direito à Justiça gratuita?, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA
(June 01, 2016), http://www.cnj.jus.br/noticias/cnj/82962-cnj-servico-quem-temdireito-a-justica-gratuita.
44
C.f. Rosenn,supra note 22, at 519 (“Fee arrangements totally contingent
upon the success of litigation are not used and would be regarded as a violation
of the attorney’s ethical duty to charge a fair amount for his services.”).
45
C.L.T., supra note 14, at art. 899, § 1 (establishing that in order to appeal,
the parties must deposit a bond corresponding to the amount of the judgment, up
to ten times the monthly minimum wage, currently circa $ 300). Even though such
appeal bond rule does not make any distinction among the parties, practice shows
42
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shows that employer-defendants are less likely than plaintiffs to appeal reasonable judgments, given the costs of continuing the suit.
However, too often defendants also do appeal reasonable decisions,
to gamble with high odds of succeeding, and to perform a convenient procrastination of payment (post-judgment interests are much
lower than average market interest rates for loaning the same
amount of a given judgment).
As to the State and Federal Justice systems, the apparent low rate
of appeals is misleading and deserves qualification. Those percentages are not based only on the rate of appeals against the main trial
court orders. An infinity of minor interlocutory decisions are also
counted in the pool of appealable decisions, causing the relative rate
of appeals to look smaller. If the percentages counted only the appeals from the main decisions, such as injunctions or final trial court
orders, the rate would likely be similar to that of the Labor Justice.
That is shown by the high absolute number of new appeals that both
federal and state appellate judges face every year—in fact more than
the ones assigned to the labor appellate judge.46
A simple calculation illustrates the gravity of the situation. If
each labor or state appellate judge receives more than 1,200 new
cases a year, in order to keep up with the incoming flow of work
(and hopefully reduce the pending docket from previous years), each
judge will have to write at least three or four opinions a day, 7 days
a week, 365 days a year. This workload pressure is even higher when
discounting vacation periods and weekends, and when considering
the time dedicated to oral arguments, to review, debate and join or
dissent from opinions of the same panel peers, and to attend to en
banc or administrative court duties. Federal judges face even more
cumbersome problems. The number of new cases and pending appeals in federal court is three times the amount presented in labor
and state courts.47 Despite the fact that a considerable amount of the
that, because most of the plaintiffs that sue at the Labor Courts are unemployed
or near-minimum-wage workers, they usually file their complaints in forma pauperis, and therefore may comfortably appeal without posting any bond.
46
JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA FEDERAL, supra note 40, at 87;
JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA ESTADUAL, supra note 40, at 130.
47
Compare JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA FEDERAL, supra note 40, at
91, with JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA DO TRABALHO, supra note 40, at
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issues in federal appeals are repetitive questions of law48—which
are faster to solve because of the application of the court’s precedents—the numbers suggest that the federal appellate court system
is also under great workload pressure.
A final caveat in relation to the numbers mentioned above is that
the nationally averaged data about solved cases and new cases may
also be misleading. Although the appellate courts are adjudicating
at approximately the same rate as new appeals are filed, when considered as a group (which would in theory at least prevent the system’s collapse), each court has a very different performance. Despite national efforts to level the courts’ structure and resources, and
to demand more and more productivity, some courts are thriving
while others are falling behind. In 2013, 60% of the state appellate
courts solved fewer appeals than the number of new appeals filed in
the same period.49 The same happened to the labor appellate courts
in 50% of the Brazilian states and 80% of the federal appellate
courts.50 Thus, there is urgent need for measures that will relieve
appellate courts of Brazil and give them room for performing better.
The situation illustrated above is the result of a complex array of
factors, one of them being the lack of stricter standards of appellate
review, which is the focus of the present study. Other factors include, for instance, the provisions of the C.P.C. and C.L.T., which
allow different and successive appeals; the usual lack of binding
precedents allowing for the proliferation of disagreements between
117, and JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA ESTADUAL, supra note 40, at 136
(12,619 new cases in Federal Justice, as compared to 2,110 in Labor Justice and
2,712 in State Justice).
48
Those repetitive questions of law used to be appealed over and over, in part
because of the traditional lack of binding precedent in Brazilian law. This situation
has been subject to reforms in the last two decades that made available several
procedural tools for solving these repetitive appeals, and for strengthening precedents, progressively departing from the typical civil law tradition. As the table
above shows, however, those reforms were not sufficient to solve the problem of
excessive appeals and other flaws of Brazilian judicial system. With the new
C.P.C. in effect, besides keeping the recently reformed provisions, Brazil will finally be adopting the stare decisis principle, aiming to make litigation faster and
cheaper, avoiding duplicative work in adjudicating the same legal issues. See
generally infra notes 102-110 and accompanying text.
49
See JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA ESTADUAL, supra note 40.
50
See JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2013: JUSTIÇA FEDERAL, supra note 40.
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lower and higher courts; the low costs for filing an appeal; and the
insufficiency of the penalties for meritless appeals.51 Further, in
some cases, such as in judgments above a certain value against public entities, appellate review is even mandatory (remessa
necessária).52 When the parties themselves do not appeal, the trial
judge is required to submit the case to the appellate court and cannot
enforce the judgment unless the order is affirmed by the appellate
court.53 Nevertheless, among all those factors, the unrestricted appellate review is one of the major reasons for the congestion in
courts, and it has not yet been subject to any attempt of legislative
reform.
Because of this unrestricted power of reviewing the decisions of
trial courts, appellate judges tend to discard the lower court’s reasonable findings and rulings, unless these are exactly the same ones
the appellate judges would have reached if they were the original
51

Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 193. In relation to the traditional lack
of binding precedent and the progressive introduction of stare decisis, see supra
note 27, infra notes 102-110, and accompanying text. As to the lack of deterrence
against meritless appeals, see Barral & Machado, supra note 7, at 193. In relation
to the excessive opportunities to appeal, in 2005 the art. 522 of the former C.P.C.
was amended to restrict interlocutory appeals (agravo de instrumento) to situations when the lack of immediate appeal may cause serious and difficult-to-repair
harm. CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] art. 522
(1973) (Braz.). Interlocutory decisions that do not cause such harm may be challenged with a written objection is allowed (agravo retido), to be examined by the
appellate court along with the eventual appeal from the final decision. Within the
specialized civil procedure applied to the labor courts, appeals are less numerous.
Interlocutory appeals were never permitted. To preserve an error for appeal, the
aggrieved party must object (protesto anti-preclusivo) verbally in writing. The
merits of an interlocutory decision are reviewed only upon an appeal from the
final judgment. See C.L.T., supra note 14, at art. 893. The new C.P.C. will also
go further limiting the situations where an appeal is possible.
52
C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 496.
53
Id. This is true unless the decision was based in the superior courts’ precedents, or unless the judgment is below a certain value, which was previously
equivalent to $18,000.00. Such low value caused most of the judgments against
government entities to be appealed, making governments some of the main “clients” that overload the courts. That problem is addressed by the new C.P.C.,
which raises such threshold to approximately $27,000.00 for municipalities,
$135,000.00 for states, and $270,000.00 for the federal government. Id. at art. 496
§ 3.
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judge.54 That approach ignores that all application of law carries
some inherent subjectivity and discretion, and that the function of
the appellate courts is to review, and not to retry the case.55 As some
Brazilian labor judges noted:
Despite the inherent interpretative activity in the application of law, some appellate opinions seem more
like a new trial court decision than an act of revision
because they virtually ignore the first instance decision. They transcribe the main statements of the
pleadings and examine the facts and evidence, as if
the appellate court was the first recipient of the evidence and of the procedural debate. It is as if the laborious work from which the trial court decision resulted could be simply disregarded. Such an attitude
stems from a misunderstanding about what is the revising function of the appellate courts (object), a misconception that also reflects on their decision-making process (method). The result that follows from
the use of this method of adjudging an appeal is inevitably the increase in the number of reversals of the
first instance decisions. It could not be any different.
The method itself induces reversal because it overlooks an inherent feature of the legal phenomenon:
the interpretative nature of the application of law,
and the necessary discretion of the decision-maker.56
This undervaluing of the first instance decisions creates excessive incentives for the parties to appeal. Given the high rate of reversions, losing parties likely view the appeal as an opportunity to
have their case decided by a panel where the judges may simply disagree with the lower court’s ruling. Since, in Brazil, the costs of appeal are not high and sanctions for meritless appeals are not commonly sustained,57 the losing party is tempted to take her chances on
54
Rosenn, supra note 22, at 508 (explaining that the appeal is a trial de novo,
and any findings of fact or law by the lower court are not presumptively correct).
55
See generally Claus et al., supra note 2.
56
Id. at 179-80.
57
Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 193.
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an appeal, no matter how reasonable the appealed decision was.
With more incentives to appeal, cases that could end in a much
shorter time are dragged through an often-lengthy sequence of appeals.
The greater quantity and length of appeals, duplicating the work
done at the trial courts, tends to overburden the already congested
appellate courts, causing delay and the decrease in quality of appellate decisions. In Brazil, appellate judges amount to approximately
twenty percent of the totality of the judges.58 If most of the cases
decided below are to be tried de novo at the appellate level, the much
fewer appellate judges, naturally, will be unable to repeat the lower
courts’ work. As an inexorable result, either the adjudication of appeals takes longer, or the quality of review decreases, because of the
shorter time appellate judges dedicate to each case, and with the excessive delegation to multiple law clerks.
One of the main justifications for the right to appeal is its function as a procedural safeguard to protect citizens from error and injustice in trial court decisions.59 However, it is pointless to try to
achieve such goal through an ample unrestricted review by appellate
courts equally prone to error due to the same congestion faced at the
lower level. It ends up that the more procedural safeguards created
to prevent error (more types of appeals or more sweeping appellate
review), the more inherently unfair the system ultimately becomes.
The lengthier and more numerous appeals tend to affect disproportionately the parties who are not economically able to endure a
lengthier and costlier process. The excess of safeguards turns against
the system.60
An unrestricted review of the facts by the appellate courts—distant from the evidence—without deference to the trial court’s findings, also contradicts the immediacy principle.61 According to this
traditional principle of procedural law, the decision-maker should

58

See Rosenn, supra note 9, at 192-94.
See SCHIAVI, supra note 29, at 17.
60
Claus et al., supra note 2, at 187 (quoting MAURO CAPPELLETTI. PROCESO,
IDEOLOGIAS E SOCIEDADE 278-79 (1973) (Arg.)).
61
Herzog & Karlen, supra note 36, at ch. 8 ¶ 59.
59
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preferably have direct contact with the evidence, to be better positioned to decide.62 When the case reaches the appellate level, a full
review of the findings of fact based merely on the written records
sacrifices the immediacy between the evidence and the decisionmaker.63 The appellate judges cannot mentally transport themselves
to the situation of the trial courtroom. The transcripts and other written records are insufficient to convey the complex facts that happen
at a trial, as a judge present in loco would perceive.64 This is especially true for the first-hand impressions acquired from directly observing and listening to the witnesses’ testimony.65 Because the trial
judge is better positioned to assess a witness’s credibility, his or her
decision should deserve deference.
Surely, the assessment of witness’s credibility does not rely entirely on demeanor. The internal consistency of the testimony, interest in the outcome of the litigation, and the capacity to observe
and report correctly are factors that do not necessarily require personal observation by the fact finder. Corroboration and contradiction of the witness’s testimony by other evidence also do not depend
on demeanor. However, many issues of fact do depend upon weighing conflicting testimonies, where the witness’s demeanor plays a
great part in the credibility assessment, which cannot be captured in
a written record and conveyed to the reviewing court.66 An appellate
court relying solely on the record is handicapped in deciding issues
of fact.67
Additionally, the unrestricted appellate review hinders the enforcement of procedural rules. The high reversion rate of reasonable
62

LEITE, supra note 29, at 566.
Herzog & Karlen, supra note 36, at ch. 8 ¶ 59.
64
Id.
65
See Claus et al., supra note 2, at 176-77.
66
Herzog & Karlen, supra note 36, at ch. 8 ¶ 59. Additionally, even though
testimonies may also be recorded on video and accessed online, only a few trial
courts have adopted such practice. One of the issues raised against this practice is
that the review of the recorded testimonies would be also very time consuming
and duplicative of the trial court’s work, not furthering the goal of reducing congestion. Thus, almost always the Brazilian appellate judges will rely only upon
the written records to decide and are not in an ideal position to appraise the witnesses’ credibility.
67
Id.
63
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discretionary rulings reduces the effectiveness of the judge’s attempts to deter misbehavior or procrastination. Much of the necessary decision power is transferred to appellate judges, despite their
distance from the realities of the trial court.
This is especially true with interlocutory decisions. When the
court grants leave for interlocutory appeals (agravo de instrumento),68 the lenient standard of review and high rates of reversal
deprive the trial judge of the necessary coercive power to enforce
good faith in the proceedings. When interlocutory decisions are not
immediately appealable and the party files a mere objection (agravo
retido69 or protesto anti-preclusivo,70 to be reviewed later, along
with the appeal on the merits), the problem is less egregious. In this
case, the only immediate way to challenge them is the writ of mandamus, which in Brazil is stricter in scope.71 Notwithstanding, parties still may procrastinate the compliance to injunctive orders—
which in Brazil are coerced through per diem fines (astreintes), but
not imprisonment—expecting to have them dissolved by the appellate court pursuant a writ of mandamus.
When an appeal from final judgment is filed, procedural issues
not yet resolved and appropriately preserved are also decided.72 At
this juncture, the interlocutory decisions become appealable and
thus now vulnerable to the unrestricted review by the appellate
court. For instance, rulings excluding a witness or an expert written
opinion (because irrelevant, duplicative or unnecessary) is often reversed and the case remanded so that the trial court hears that evidence and amends its decision appropriately. A higher degree of deference to the trial courts discretionary procedural decisions would
68

See Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 196-97
Agravo retido is the objection from an interlocutory decision in the general
civil procedure. Id.
70
Protesto anti-preclusivo is the objection from an interlocutory decision in
the specialized labor procedure.
71
When no appeal is immediately available, an interlocutory decision may
also be challenged through the writ of mandamus (mandado de segurança), if it
violates certain and definite rights (direito líquido e certo), a much stricter scope
of review than in interlocutory appeals. See Lei No. 1.533, de 31 de Dezembro de
1951, Diário Oficial da União de 31.12.1951 [D.O.U. ] arts. 1-3 (Braz.). See also
infra note 94, and accompanying notes.
72
See supra note 51 (interlocutory appeals).
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reduce these duplicative proceedings and discourage the parties
from insisting on irrelevant or excessive evidence. Another example
is when an appellate court reviews the application of procedural
sanctions. It tends to presume the good faith of the sanctioned party
and too often reverse the sanctions under a de novo standard of review, instead of presuming that the trial judge ruled correctly (because closer to the situation) and deferring to such decision.
III.
AMERICAN STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The American standards of review are consistent with the Brazilian trend of reforms to make litigation faster, cheaper and more
efficient.73 They could inspire legislative change, or even persuade
the courts to create, through precedent, a self-restrained approach to
appellate review. One of the main shortcomings of the civil law legal
systems is the deep disregard for the first instance courts’ decisions
and the glorification of appellate courts, a defect not present at the
Anglo-Saxon common law system.74 The pragmatism embodied in
the American standards of appellate review would increase the respect for the facts found by the trial courts and focus appeals mostly
on errors of law. In the American legal system, appellate courts do
not adjudicate disputes between parties; they only review decisions
of other courts about those disputes.75 Similarly to appeal in Brazil,
it encompasses only the issues raised by the appellants that were
sufficiently preserved for review and that actually affect the rights
of parties, not the so-called harmless errors.76 However, the American appellate courts are further limited by the standards of review,77
a feature not present at the Brazilian appellate procedure.
A standard of review is “the level of deference given by the reviewing court to another tribunal’s action or ruling,”78 a “measuring
73

See infra notes 171-79 and accompanying text (reforms and current debates
on Brazilian civil procedure law).
74
Claus et al., supra note 2, at 187 (quoting MAURO CAPPELLETTI. PROCESO,
IDEOLOGIAS E SOCIEDADE 278-79 (1973) (Arg.)).
75
Peters, supra note 7, at 235.
76
See Walter H. Sargent, The Meaning of Standard of Review, APPELLATE
PRACTICE IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS § 3.01 (2014).
77
Id.
78
Id.
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stick” that defines the depth of review and assigns power among judicial actors.79 Appellate courts’ authority over a trial court’s ruling
is limited by the standards of review, requiring appellate judges to
use self-restraint in their own decision-making.80
The reasons usually raised for use of standards of review in the
American legal system include the balance of power among judges,
the efficiency of the judicial system, consistency and predictability.81 First, while the trial court judge is better suited as a first-hand
observer, fact finder, and litigation manager, the appellate court is
focused in ascertaining whether the trial court correctly applied the
law.82 Standards of review help judges respect each other’s
strengths, assigning balanced power among judicial actors and force
the appellate court to recognize that the decision reached below
should be the final unless containing a harmful error.83 Second, a
deferential standard of review furthers judicial economy, protecting
the appellate court’s time and resources.84 Standards of review prevent the repetition of the trial on appeal, simplify and improve the
review process.85 By reducing the number of issues on appeal, the
appellate court may spend more time on a careful review of the issues on appeal.86 Third, a standardized review process helps reach
consistency between the decisions, as each appellate judge sees the
appealed issues from the same angle.87 Finally, standards of review
provide predictability and notice to the parties interested in appealing of what to expect on appeal.88 A more realistic view about the

79
Steven Alan Childress, Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil Appeals, 229 F.R.D. 267, 268-69 (2005) (quoting John C. Godbold, Twenty Pages
and Twenty Minutes—Effective Advocacy on Appeal, 30 SW. L.J. 801, 810
(1976)).
80
Peters, supra note 7, at 235.
81
Id. at 238-42.
82
Id. at 235.
83
Id. at 235-36, 238.
84
Id. at 240-41.
85
Id. at 241.
86
Peters, supra note 7, at 241.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 241-42.
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chances of winning makes it less likely that a frivolous appeal is
filed, and encourages appellate settlements.89
The standards of appellate review are far from being a precise
test or formula. Many nuances or shadings of a spectrum pass under
each single standard of review phrase.90 Most of the jurisdictions
apply four major standards of review as markers along this spectrum.91 A legal error is reviewed de novo (anew) with the trial
court’s decision receiving little, if any, presumption of correctness
or deference.92 In reviewing the trial judge’s fact-findings, a more
deferential “clearly erroneous” standard of review is applied.93 “A
finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”94
Even more deference is given to jury fact-findings, which are reviewed for substantial evidence—”such relevant evidence as a reasonable person mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”95 Finally, the most lenient standard is abuse of discretion, often used to review procedural matters decided by the trial court,96
which may be found when the decision is clearly unreasonable or
arbitrary.97
A.

Questions of law
In the American judicial system, the trial court judge’s determinations of law are not entitled to any formal deference by appellate
courts, which is called a review de novo (anew).98 For the parties

89

Id. at 241.
See id. at 243.
91
Id.
92
Kevin Casey, Jade Camara & Nancy Wright, Standards of Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit: Substance and Semantics, 11 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 279,
282 (2002).
93
Id.
94
Id. (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948)).
95
Id. (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)).
96
Peters, supra note 7, at 243.
97
Id. Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 286.
98
Id.
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wishing to appeal, that is the easiest hurdle to overcome, theoretically a fresh start where the debate begins “anew.”99
The use of the term de novo is actually a misnomer, implying
that there is a determination of the matter “as if it had not been heard
before and no decision had been rendered.”100 De novo review actually means that the appellate court has the power and competency to
reach a different conclusion with no particular deference the decision below,101 independently reviewing conclusions of law and reversing them when there is a legal error.102 However, an appellate
court does not “start from scratch,” but rather starts with careful consideration of the trial court’s work.103 The lower court’s “view of the
legal effect of the fact pattern before it is not to be lightly disregarded.”104 There is a presumption that the trial court’s decision was
correct, which most appellants fail to overcome. Additionally, a particular judge’s reputation or expertise may incline an appellate court
to review this judge’s legal determinations with more or less confidence,105 and a well-written trial court opinion examining thoroughly the law on a new issue may be very persuasive.106
B.

Questions of fact
In the American federal civil procedure, in which many state
court systems are also inspired, the trial judge’s “[f]indings of fact,
whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to
the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”107
As the Supreme Court stated, “[a] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’
when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
99

Sargent, supra note 76, § 3.04.
Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 291.
101
Id.
102
Childress, supra note 79, at 274.
103
Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 291 (quoting Key Pharms. v.
Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 713 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
104
Id. (quoting Fina Research, S.A. v. Baroid Ltd., 141 F.3d 1479, 1481 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)).
105
Sargent, supra note 76, § 3.04.
106
Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 290.
107
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
100
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that a mistake has been committed.”108 A reviewing court should not
reverse the finding of the trial judge “simply because it is convinced
that it would have decided the case differently.”109 Actually, if the
finding is reasonable in light of the record, the appellate court “may
not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the
trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where
there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”110
That applies also to physical or documentary evidence, not only
witness credibility. Deference to trial court is not due only to its superior position to assess credibility, but also because of its expertise
in fact-finding and to the division of labor between the courts, avoiding the duplication of efforts.111 However, the Supreme Court recognizes that even more deference is due under the clearly erroneous
standard to findings based upon the credibility of witnesses.112
The question, under a clear error standard, is not whether the
findings were correct, but rather whether they were clearly wrong.113
As it is a very lenient standard, when the trial court’s fact-findings
are unfavorable, in a settled area of the law, there is little chance to
win on appeal.114 An appellant would have to show that the findings
“lack any rational connection to the record or that the vast weight of
the evidence” to render a finding certainly wrong, which is rare.115
C.

Jury findings
While the clearly erroneous standard of review applies to bench
trial findings of fact, the findings by the jury are more difficult to set
aside, being reviewed under the substantial evidence test.116 Jury
findings of fact are generally insulated from review by the Seventh
Amendment, which states, “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985).
Id. 573-74
Sargent, supra note 76, § 3.04).
Id. (referencing Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575).
Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 299.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 307.
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re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.”117 According to the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50, a finding by a jury cannot be set aside unless there is
“no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to make
such a finding.” To assess such sufficiency the court should review
“all of the evidence in the record, drawing all reasonable inferences
in favor of the jury’s verdict without making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.”118
This sufficiency test is often referred to as “substantial evidence.”119 Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence taken from
the record as a whole that might be accepted by a reasonable mind
as adequate to support the finding under review.120 It does not imply
a great quantity or strength of evidence, just enough evidence allowing reasonable minds to disagree (thus a proper issue for the jury to
decide), and not a mere “scintilla of evidence,” which is insufficient
to present a question for the jury.121 The test only requires reasonableness from the jury.122 If a finding is unreasonable (impartial reasonable minds could not differ as to its erroneousness), then such
finding becomes reversible.123
However, the jury verdict is not itself the object of the appellate
review. Rather, the object of review is the trial court’s ruling on the
motion for judgment as a matter of law, where the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting that verdict was challenged.124 Thus, even
though such ruling is technically a legal determination, reviewed de
novo by the appellate court, it is unlikely to be reversed on appeal
because it depends on the highly deferential standard of review, requiring mere sufficiency of the evidence.125

117

U.S. Const. amend. VII.
Sargent, supra note 76, § 3.04 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 and Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149-51 (2000)).
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Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 286.
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Id. at 308 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229
(1938)).
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Id. at 309.
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Childress, supra note 79, at 331.
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Childress, supra note 79, at 331.
124
Sargent, supra note 76, § 3.04.
125
Id.
118

2017]

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

79

D.

Mixed questions of law and fact
Mixed questions of law and fact are “questions in which historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed,
and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to
put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.”126 Therefore, the “mixed question”
is what remains after the historical facts and the applicable rule of
law was established under their respective standards of review—the
application of such rule to the facts.127 There is “no rigid rule” about
what standard of review to apply to mixed questions.128 A “deferential review of mixed questions of law and fact is warranted when it
appears that the district court is ‘better positioned’ than the appellate
court to decide the issue in question or that probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine.”129
Usually, the free review of legal conclusions while deferring to
underlying facts may be the clearest way to approach mixed findings.130 For instance, in Eighth Amendment cases, whether a fine is
excessive requires the application of a constitutional standard to the
concrete facts, which is reviewed de novo.131 Some courts say that
the application of law to fact is freely redone on appeal, which
makes sense if law is made in the process, but often the application
is simply the fact-finding function that the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 protects.132 These courts probably meant that application
of law is reviewed de novo where the court develops the legal standard.133
As one commentator proposed, based on the Supreme Court
precedents, a mixed finding of law and fact should be reviewed free
of the restrictions of Rule 52(a) when this finding requires the refinement or interpretation of a complex legal rule in the application
126

Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982).
Sargent, supra note 76, § 3.04 (citing United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d
1195, 1200-02 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc)).
128
Id.
129
Id. (quoting Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991)).
130
Childress, supra note 79, at 276 (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104
(1985)).
131
Id. (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337 n.10 (1998)).
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Id.
133
Id. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
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of that rule to clear historical facts.134 If the rule, although undisputed in the abstract, is uncertain or bound up with sensitive matters
of public political policy, the appellate courts are competent to review it broadly, furthering its institutional and corrective function.135 However, upon the application of a definite and noncontroversial legal rule to complex findings of fact, where trial court’s articulated findings may not represent fully the complex bundle of evidentiary data and credibility determinations, the appellate court
generally is not in a good position to review the legal characterization of such historical facts.136 The application of such legal rules to
the facts should be characterized as factual inferences, and its appellate review should be subject to the restrictions of Rule 52(a).137
E.

Discretionary rulings
In deciding procedural matters—such as discovery disputes, trial
schedules, motions for continuances, objections, equitable relief or
sanctions—there is usually no one right way to rule. The trial court
has a range of alternatives that are permissible under the legal rule
and appellate courts ordinarily defer to a discretionary ruling unless
it is outside such acceptable range—where the trial court “abused”
its discretion.138 The term “abuse” of discretion does not mean bad
faith, or outrageousness in the trial court’s ruling, and does not imply that an appellate court will reverse only gross errors.139 All it
means is that an appellate court cannot set aside a discretionary judicial ruling, unless it has a “definite and firm conviction that the

134

Id.
Charles Richard Calleros, Title VII and Rule 52(a): Standards of Appellate
Review in Disparate Treatment Cases-Limiting the Reach of Pullman-Standard v.
Swint, 58 TUL. L. REV. 403, 425 (1983).
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See Childress, supra note 79, at 276.
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Id. at 275
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Sargent, supra note 76, § 3.04 (citing National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 642, (1976) (“the question is not whether the
appellate court would have taken the same action; it is whether the trial court
abused its discretion in doing so”) and Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559
n.1 (1988) (“It is especially common for issues involving what can broadly be
labeled ‘supervision of litigation’ . . . to be given abuse-of-discretion review”)).
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Id. (quoting In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 1954)).
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court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion
it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.”140
An appellate court will be predisposed to affirm such decision.
The abuse of discretion standard reflects the rationale that discretionary decisions are best left to the trial court, given this court’s
superior knowledge of the record, proceedings, and people in the
case, and given that an abstract legal rule cannot anticipate all the
infinite variety of situations in which such decisions may arise.141
Typically, a discretionary decision will be reversed when the trial
court did not conform to enunciated standards in exercising its discretion (for example, granting a preliminary injunction and ignoring
the traditional four-factor test),142 when it based its decision on a
legal error or on incorrect factual findings, or when it failed to explain the reasons for its decision.143
IV.

APPLYING THE AMERICAN STANDARDS OF APPELLATE
REVIEW TO BRAZILIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE

A.
Would standards of review be useful to improve Brazilian
civil procedure?
To assess the applicability of standards of review to Brazilian
civil procedure, the first question is whether they would be useful—
whether they would help to achieve the goals of procedural law,
such as fairness, expediency and efficiency. The answer is affirmative. Although these standards are not part of the present Brazilian
legal culture, the problems that they are designed to solve in the
United States are also present in Brazil.144 A more rational division
of labor between trial and appellate courts avoiding the duplication
of efforts would also be welcome in Brazil, where most of the cases adjudged at first instance

courts are appealed, overburdening the courts.145 The Brazilian judicial system would also largely
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See Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 310.
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908 F.2d 951, 954 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
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benefit from the recognition that the trial court is in a better position to assess the credibility

of
witnesses, and its proximity to the record, proceedings, and people
in the case, recommend deference to its reasonable findings of fact
and discretionary choices. As it happens in the United States, lower
odds of reversing reasonable trial court decisions would reduce the
incentives to appeal and cause a natural selection of the stronger
cases to be appealed.146 That would save precious judicial resources,
which could be directed to performing a faster and better adjudication of the more meritorious appeals.
As to the de novo standard applied in reviewing questions of law,
that is already the rule in Brazil—except that in Brazil this is usually
the only standard, an unrestricted review with no deference to the
lower court’s decision, even in factual or discretionary matters.147
That standard should be maintained in relation to questions of pure
interpretation of the law. Deferring to the diverse and possibly conflicting interpretations of a rule of law given by several trial courts,
no matter how reasonable these interpretations may be, would naturally result in uncertainty and counter the trend of unifying precedents in Brazil.148 Claimants in similar factual situations would
likely yield inconsistent results in different courts under the same
rule of law.149 Divergences in the interpretation of the law naturally
arise between the courts, and appellate review is needed exactly to
ensure precedent uniformity, and the resulting equal treatment of the
citizens.150 Further, resolving disagreements in interpretation of the
law reduce uncertainty as how it is to be applied, one of the major
causes of litigation.151 An unrestricted de novo review of legal issues, in that sense, furthers the goal of obtaining consistent and uniform interpretation of the law across the country, in harmony with
the effort to unify judicial precedents.
As to the substantial (or sufficient) evidence standard, despite its
usefulness as part of a comparative study of the American appellate

146
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148
149
150
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See Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 310.
Rosenn, supra note 22, at 507.
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system, this standard is not really applicable to the civil appellate
procedure in Brazil, where the jury is restricted to homicide cases.152
In relation to discretionary decisions, though, the need for
change is urgent. Trial court judges are not supposed to be automatons governed in every minute detail by exhaustive rules. There are
legitimate discretionary choices to be made within the limits of the
law, and the reviewing courts should not be fast to interfere.153 The
American “abuse of discretion” standard appropriately respects
these legitimate choices, and reinforces the institutional strengths of
both the appellate and trial courts. The trial judge is responsible for
keeping the court’s docket under control, ensuring quality and reasonable processing speed.154 The judge’s procedural discretionary
decisions, within the legally permissible range, are based in his or
her experience as to what is effective to balance expediency, fairness, and the enforcement of good faith during proceedings.155
Therefore, when a panel of appellate judges substitute a reasonable
discretionary choice of the trial judge for the one they would have
made if they were the trial judge, they end up harming the effectiveness of the whole system.156 That results from the unnecessary duplication of the work and because parties and attorneys start to perceive the trial judge as powerless, just a passage to the real decision
makers, the appellate judges. As in the United States, the Brazilian
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Rosenn, supra note 22, at 191.
Herzog & Karlen, supra note 36, at ch.8 ¶ 104.
154
Id.
155
Since discretionary rulings are frequently interlocutory decisions, the restriction of interlocutory appeals acts to give some deference to these rulings. See
id. In the Brazilian general civil procedure, interlocutory appeals are permitted
only when the lack of immediate appeal may cause serious and difficult-to-repair
harm, while in labor procedure they are never available, and parties sometimes try
to use the much stricter writ of mandamus, see supra note 42. A writ of mandamus
is often used to bypass such restriction, but its scope of review much stricter (clear
and certain right), giving deference to the trial court’s discretionary rulings, but
only until the correspondent objections to these rulings are reviewed together with
the appeal from final decision. Therefore, despite being initially protected from
attack, many interlocutory decisions are easily overturned on the final appeal,
such as decision excluding evidence (cerceamento de defesa), and sanctions for
bad-faith litigation (litigância de má-fé).
156
Herzog & Karlen, supra note 36, at ch.8 ¶ 90.
153
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appellate courts should be predisposed to affirm reasonable discretionary decisions, absent a clear error of judgment.
For analogous reasons, the findings of fact of trial judges should
not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. The American formulation avoids the easy reversion simply because the appellate panel is
convinced that it would have decided differently.157 In an overburdened system, as in Brazil,158 ignoring the reasonable factual findings of the trial judge is a luxury that reduces the efficiency of the
proceedings, while adding very little in terms of fairness to the system. Who can say that the right finding of fact is that of the appellate
judges and not the reversed one, of the trial court? The rationale for
the unrestricted review is that possible errors—committed by overburdened trial judges—would likely be corrected by a panel of more
experienced judges. However, such argument fails where the system
itself causes these appellate judges to be equally or even more overburdened, and where they have the disadvantage of not being able
to observe the witnesses. Thus, a finding of fact should rarely be
reversed—only when such finding is clearly wrong, lacking any rational connection to the record or to the vast weight of the evidence.
Finally, the so-called mixed questions of law and fact raise the
greatest challenge, because there is no uniform rule to their standard
of review.159 In the United States, courts have been dealing with the
issue for decades, and it is part of the American legal culture.160 The
lack of consistency does not defeat its application, as courts are used
to developing legal concepts by slowly refining them through binding case-by-case precedents, a typical feature of the common-law
system.
However, when it comes to transporting such legal concept to
another country, consistency is key—or at least a clear and workable
157

Id.
See Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Reform in Brazil, 4 NAFTA: L. & BUS. REV.
AM. 19, 27 (1998) (explaining the “extraordinary degree” of the problem that exists in Brazil).
159
Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 316-17. The application of a
rule of law to the historical facts found to be true, after those have already been
established under their respective standards of review. See supra notes 76-83 and
accompanying text.
160
Id. at 319.
158
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rule. In Brazil, courts sometimes also introduce and refine legal concepts through the progressive build-up of precedents. Despite the
fact that these precedents were not usually binding, they were always persuasive and often ended up codified by the legislators. 161
Thus, the issue here is not whether the Brazilian have the power to
adopt and refine a new idea, but whether this idea is sufficiently
clear and persuasive at the outset to conquer sufficient support and
ensure its adoption.
The application of law to facts is inherent to any judicial decision. Usually, the decision will hinge on whether a rule applies to a
specific type of factual circumstance, a determination that, by itself,
might be useful to defining the reach of such rule for application in
future cases. In other cases, the application of law to the facts is more
of a case-by-case fact-intensive assessment of peculiar circumstances in light of a well-defined legal standard.162 If application of
law to facts were always reviewed de novo, it would leave very little
room for deference to the reasonable decisions of the trial judges in
those fact-intensive cases where they are better positioned to decide
and that bear little interest for the unification of precedents.163 On
the other hand, using a “clearly erroneous” standard for all mixed
questions of law and fact would swallow the rule of de novo review
for questions of law, since all law suits involve the application of
rules of law to facts.164 It would also give excessive deference to
trial courts, compromising the consistency of the system by allowing reasonable, but divergent, decisions to be shielded from reversal,
something that the recent reforms in Brazilian civil procedure are
exactly trying to eliminate.165

161

Precedents in Brazil are still considered persuasive authority, except for the
binding súmulas or for the precedent unification tools recently introduced. That
situation will change when the new C.P.C. comes into effect, in 2016, introducing
stare decisis as a general principle in Brazilian civil procedure. See infra notes
171-79 and accompanying text.
162
Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 318.
163
Id. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
164
C.f. id. at 318-19.
165
Id.

86

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:3

The Supreme Court of the United States acknowledges that there
is “no rigid rule” about mixed questions standard of review.166 The
Court stated that a “deferential review of mixed questions of law and
fact is warranted when it appears that the [trial] court is ‘better positioned’ . . . to decide the issue in question or that probing appellate
scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine.”167 That
seems to be the clearest enunciation of a workable rule as to the review of the trial judge’s application of law to facts. Presumptively,
there will be a predominant legal question reviewed de novo, but
when it is a case-by-case fact-intensive determination of no interest
for precedent unification and refinement, the lower decision should
receive deference and not be disturbed unless “clearly erroneous.”
B.
Is it possible to apply the American standards of appellate
review to Brazilian civil procedure?
After establishing the convenience of using standards that limit
appellate review, making the system more rational and effective, the
next question is whether their introduction in the Brazilian legal system would face any impediment. The answer is negative because
there is a favorable environment for changes in Brazilian civil procedure, the lack of a correspondent statutory rule does not prevent
appellate judges from performing a more deferential review, and
there is no conflict with any constitutional principle or statutory provision.
1. Receptivity of the Brazilian legal system to solutions based
on comparative law
In Brazil, there is a favorable environment for changes that promote efficiency in civil procedure, including ideas based on comparative law. The last twenty years have seen several reforms focusing on the limitation of appeals and a progressive march towards
precedent unification and binding effect. Additionally, there is a de-
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Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 701 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
see Casey, Camara & Wright, supra note 92, at 318.
167
Sargent, supra note 76, § 3.04 (quoting Salve Regina College v. Russell,
499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991)).
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bate on the necessity of empowering the trial courts by giving deference to their reasonable decisions, and a national policy of the judiciary branch to empower the trial courts by balancing budget and
infrastructure, and by encouraging innovative practices.
For roughly two decades, Brazilian civil procedure has been a
laboratory for reforms that attempted to remove the causes that prevented the judiciary from providing a fast, inexpensive and effective
service. Precedents of the Supremo Tribunal Federal (S.T.F.)168 and
the Superior Tribunal de Justiça (S.T.J.)169 became basis for summary rejection of agravos170 based on conflicting jurisprudence.
They also became basis for summarily granting the agravos and the
underlying appeals when the appealed decision is inconsistent with
such precedents.171 Additionally, all appellate courts were granted
the power to summarily dismiss appeals clearly inadmissible, meritless or against precedents of the same court or of the superior
courts.172 In 2005, an amendment to the Constitution brought greater
changes to the judiciary branch, including the limited introduction

168

The S.T.F. is the constitutional court of Brazil. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL
[C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 102. (Braz.).
169
The Superior Tribunal de Justiça (S.T.J.) is the highest court for issues of
federal non-constitutional law. See C.F., supra note 168, at art. 105.
170
Agravos here are limited appeals against decisions of intermediate appellate courts that dismissed extraordinary or special appeals. The extraordinary appeal (recurso extraordinário) is directed to the S.T.F. and is restricted to direct
offenses to the constitution (it cannot be, for instance, a violation to federal law
that only indirectly also violates de Constitution). See id., at art. 102, III. The special appeal (recurso especial) is directed to the S.T.J. and is restricted to violations
of treaties and federal law, as well as inconstant interpretation of federal law between intermediate appellate courts. See id., at art. 105, III.
171
Both extraordinary and special appeals are subject to an initial screening
(exame de admissibilidade) at the intermediate appellate courts, who may dismiss
them for non-compliance with their legal requirements. Such decision is not final,
and the party may still challenge it with an agravo, a limited appeal that takes
such screening directly to the S.T.F. or S.T.J. C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 1042.
172
C.P.C. (1973) supra note 51, at art. 557, §1º-A, introduced by Lei no.
9.756, de 17 de Dezembro de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] (Braz.).
Besides the S.T.J., the other Brazilian superior courts are the Tribunal Superior
do Trabalho (T.S.T., labor jurisdiction), Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (T.S.E., elections) and Tribunal Superior Militar (T.S.M., for military cases). C.F., supra note
168, at art. 92.
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of binding precedent for the S.T.F., the súmula vinculante173—a nationally binding version of the decades-old practice of creating black
letter rule statements that summarize the main legal principles repetitively held in the S.T.F. opinions.174 The same amendment also introduced the general repercussion (repercussão geral) requirement
to all the extraordinary appeals, allowing the S.T.F. to pick only the
more relevant cases and mandating the application of its constitutional issue holding to all the similar cases pending in the country.175
Additionally, the current C.P.C. was changed so that the parties cannot appeal a trial court decision that is consistent with the súmulas
of the S.T.F. and S.T.J.,176 and cases may be summarily dismissed
by trial courts when the controverted issue is a pure question of law
already ruled unfavorably by that same court.177 In 2014, similar
173

C.F., supra note 168, at art. 103-A, introduced by amend. 45 (2004).
“Brazil does have the institution of the súmula, which began in the S.T.F.
[Brazilian Supreme Court] in 1964 and has since spread to other tribunals. It is a
numbered series of capsulized legal rules, usually only one sentence in length,
summarizing the holding of the court. These norms are enshrined in the súmula
only after the case law has ‘firmed up’ in a specific direction. Most deal with very
ordinary questions of law. Typical is No. 554, which provides: ‘Payment of a
check, issued without provision for funds, after receipt of the criminal accusation
is no obstacle to proceeding with the criminal action.’ These case law rules float
freely, almost totally disembodied from the facts of the cases upon which they are
based. These rules are technically not binding on judges lower in the hierarchy,
but they are usually followed because failure to do so usually assures summary
reversal.” Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Reform in Brazil, 4 NAFTA: L. & BUS. REV.
AM. 19, 26-27 (1998) (citations omitted). The Brazilian legal system—as the civil
law systems in general—traditionally did not adopt the stare decisis principle. Departing from this tradition, in an effort to reduce congestion of the intermediate
and superior appellate courts, there have been legislative reforms strengthening
precedents, such as the creation of the S.T.F. binding súmulas, as well as reforms
that gave the other high courts’ súmulas the effect of barring appeals when the
decision below is consistent with a súmula. See supra notes 101-104, and accompanying text. Finally, the approved new C.P.C. completes the transition to binding
precedents, similarly to common law jurisdictions, effective in March of 2016.
See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
175
C.F. supra note 168, at art. 102 §3, introduced by amend. 45 (2004);
C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 1035 (Braz.).
176
C.P.C. (1973), supra note 51, at art. 518 §1, introduced by Lei no. 11.276,
de 7 de Fevereiro de 2006, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] (Braz.).
177
C.P.C. (1973), supra note 51, at art. 285-A, introduced by Lei no. 11.277,
de 7 de Fevereiro de 2006, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] (Braz.).
174
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tools to reduce the number of appeals and unify precedents were introduced into the labor procedure.178 Finally, the procedural code
itself was entirely revamped.
The recently approved New C.P.C. not only embraces the improvements mentioned above, but goes a great step further, addressing many of the long debated problems of Brazilian civil procedure.
One of its main new features is the attachment of binding effect to
the appellate and high court opinions, in a similar fashion as the
common law countries, a major approximation of Brazil to that legal
tradition.179 Thus, there is no reason to believe that the adoption of
common law inspired standards of review would face any rejection
because of its foreign origin. Brazil has long departed from being a
traditional civil law jurisdiction and is quite open to solutions that
may be found in other legal systems, as the reforms mentioned
above exemplify.
Further, Brazilian judges have been raising a debate over the
need, not only for change of legislation, but also for awareness of
the roles of trial and appellate courts, where appellate courts review
and not retry the case, deferring to the trial courts’ reasonable decisions.180 A similar thesis has been approved by a significant amount
of federal labor judges in 2012, during the 16th National Congress
of Labor Judges (CONAMAT).181
178

Lei no. 13.015, de 21 de Julho de 2014, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] (Braz.).
179
See Senado Federal [Brazilian Senate], Exposição de Motivos [Advisory
Committee Notes], ANTEPROJETO DO NOVO CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL
[PROJECT OF THE NEW CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] 11-33 (2010) (Braz.),
available at http://www.senado.gov.br/senado/novocpc/pdf/anteprojeto.pdf (last
visited Nov. 16, 2014). See also C.P.C., supra note 9, at art. 1013 § 1.
180
See generally Claus et al., supra note 2.
181
“Systemic deference to trial court decisions. Reviewing function of the appellate courts. Respected the conviction and independence of each judge, the Labor Courts will defer to the credibility assessment of witnesses by the trial courts.
The lack of systemic deference to the decisions of the trial judge contributes decisively to the congestion of the appellate courts. The principle of immediacy
leads to the presumption that the credibility assessment of witnesses by the trial
judge is appropriate. Measures shall be taken to enhancement systemic deference
to the first instance decisions (translation by the author).” Available at http://an
amatra.tempsite.ws/conamat2012/tesesaprovadasconamat.asp, last access in
11/15/2014.
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Lastly, the idea of empowering the trial courts as a means to
make the entire system more efficient is also in harmony with the
public policy set by the National Council Justice (CNJ),182 the National Policy of Priority Attention to the First Instance Courts (Política Nacional de Atenção Prioritária ao Primeiro Grau de Jurisdição). That policy involves the coordination of local and national
actions to balance budget and workforce between the first instance
and the appellate courts. It also aims to provide adequate infrastructure and information technology to trial courts, encourage trial
judges to participate in the administration of the judiciary, and reward the best practices and innovative projects that further the policy.183
2. Inexistence of constitutional or legal impediments to the
use of restrictive standards of review in Brazilian civil
procedure
The lack of a statutory rule introducing and regulating standards
of appellate review does not prevent judges from applying a deferential review based on a systematic interpretation of the legal system, notably constitutional principles. On the other hand, no constitutional principle or statutory provision bar the immediate adoption
of such standards by the Brazilian courts. However, a statutory
change expressly introducing them in the Brazilian civil procedure
would ensure the uniform adoption, best furthering the goal of reducing the burden on appellate courts and improving the efficacy of
the entire system.
Even though in Brazil it is not possible to find entire bodies of
law created by judges in the vacuum of statutory rules, such as in
the common law countries, Brazilian judges do have a great deal of
182

The Conselho Nacional de Justiça is the highest administrative and disciplinary organ of the Brazilian judiciary, and it is made of fifteen members: one
justice of the S.T.F., one of the S.T.J. and one of the T.S.T., three appellate and
three trial court judges, two prosecutors, two attorneys and two citizens of notable
legal knowledge. See Composição atual, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA,
http://www.cnj.jus.br/sobre-o-cnj/composicao (last visited Nov. 26. 2014).
183
CNJ, Resolution 194 (2014) (Braz.), available at http://www.cnj.jus.b
r/atos-administrativos/atos-da-presidencia/resolucoespresidencia/28659-resolucao-n-194-de-26-de-maio-de-2014 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
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liberty to interpret the existing law and to fill gaps in creative manners, as the circumstances require. The French Revolution’s dogma
that the Judiciary branch should only apply—and not interpret—the
law designed by the Legislative branch has long been proven impracticable and abandoned. In Brazilian current post-positivist and
neo-constitutionalist legal culture, 184 judges are expected to ensure
full normative force to the constitutional principles. Using them as
a compass while filling the gaps in the legal system, judges are free
to interpret the existing statutes in light of such principles or even to
find those statutes void when they violate a constitutional principle.185 Here, the observance of standards of review furthers a constitutional right—the right to a reasonable duration of process and
to the means that will ensure its celerity, especially when the Brazilian Constitution states that fundamental rights and guaranties are
immediately applicable. 186 Additionally, it is not uncommon that
new legal concepts and institutes in Brazil are, in a first moment,
discussed in scholarship and introduced in vanguard decisions, only
later earning progressive support and being formally codified.
Judges in Brazil usually cite scholarship (doutrina) for support on
issues with no statute on point, and both scholarship and judges do
use comparative law as a source. Comparative law is indeed expressly listed as a gap-filling source of law by the C.L.T.187
Additionally, there is no constitutional or legal impediment to
the adoption of standards of review in Brazil. There is neither an
express or implied constitutional principle, nor statutory provisions
184
See Luís Roberto Barroso, Neoconstitucionalismo e constitucionalização
do Direito. O triunfo tardio do Direito Constitucional no Brasil. 10 JUS
NAVIGANDI 851 (Nov. 1, 2005) (Braz.), available at http://jus.com.br/artigos/
7547.
185
See, e.g., Luís Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human
Dignity in Contemporary Law and in the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INTL.
& COMP. L. REV. 331, 356 (2012).
186
See C.F., supra note 168, at art. 5, LXXVIII, included by amend. 45 (2005)
(“To all, in judicial and administrative proceedings, are assured a reasonable duration of proceedings and the means to guarantee the celerity of proceedings”); id.
at art. 5, § 1 (“The provisions that define the fundamentals rights and guarantees
have immediate application”), available at http://www.v-brazil.com/government
/laws/constitution.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
187
C.L.T., supra note 14, at art. 8.
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that bars the adoption of standards of review by the Brazilian courts.
Let us examine the issue in face of the judge’s independence guarantee, the double degree of jurisdiction principle, and the language
in the C.P.C. that regulates appeals.
Standards of review do not affect judicial independence. As one
of the guarantees of a democratic regime, judicial independence
aims at providing judicial decisions free from pressure, be it from
the organized society, from political or economic interest groups, or
from other courts.188 In Brazil, judicial independence is embodied in
the judgeship guarantees of life tenure, irremovability, irreducibility
of pay,189 and immunity as to the content of the judicial opinions.190
A limitation of the appellate review power does not affect the
judges’ independence because it merely changes the distribution of
that decision power between judges. It does not subject them to pressure or undue influence to decide in a certain way or another. Just as
the binding súmulas allocate more power to the S.T.F.,191 eliminating the lower courts’ power to ignore the S.T.F.’s súmulas,192 here
there would be a reduction of the decision power of appellate courts
and the correspondent increase at the trial courts, whose decisions
would more likely be final.
Standards of review also do not affect the double degree of jurisdiction principle, because it does not mean that appeals are unrestricted or that every decision is necessarily appealable, but merely
the possibility of judicial review by higher courts. It cannot be taken

188
See generally Jorge Luiz Souto Maior & Marcos Neves Fava, A Defesa de
sua Independência: Um Dever do Magistrado, 123 REVISTA DE DIREITO DO
TRABALHO 67 (2006) (Braz.).
189
C.F., supra note 168, at art. 95.
190
Lei Complementar no. 35, de 14 de Março de 1979, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] art. 41 (establishing that judges cannot be punished or prejudiced
due to their opinions or content of their decision, except in case of improbity or
excesses in language).
191
See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text (binding súmulas). C.F.,
supra note 168, at art. 103.
192
Id. Under an overreaching comprehension of what independence of the judiciary means, causing cases on issues already pacified by the S.T.F. to be dragged
up for years only to be later reversed by the S.T.F.

2017]

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

93

too far, causing unnecessary delay, which especially benefits delinquent debtors.193 Although courts and scholarship are split on
whether this principle has constitutional status or not, it is generally
agreed that it is not absolute. The legislation may establish conditions for appeals (pressupostos de admissibilidade), such as posting
a bond (depósito recursal), or even may eliminate certain appeals,
such as with some small claims.194 Extensive changes have already
limited the scope of appeals in light of higher courts’ precedents.195
The double degree principle does not conflict with the standards of
review when many other restrictions have already proven its relativeness. Additionally, standards of review do not even restrict parties from appealing, but only change the thought process of the decision-makers, reducing the likelihood of reversals.
Finally, there is no language in the Brazilian civil procedure
rules that prevent the use of standards of review. The reviewing effect (efeito devolutivo)196 means only that an appeal has the effect of
resubmitting a case to the judiciary branch after a final judgment.197
It does not relate as to whether the decision method of the appellate
courts is unrestricted or more deferential. Similarly, when art. 1008
of the C.P.C. mentions that the decision proffered by the appellate
tribunal replaces the appealed trial court decision, it also does not
touch upon the method through which the appellate ruling is
reached. It merely indicates that the source of authority is now the
appellate decision, and not the appealed one, even if the appellate
court simply confirmed the decision below.198 It is generally understood that the appellate courts have full adjudicatory power over the
issues raised on appeal, as if it were the trial judge.199 However, such
power is not granted by the procedural statute, it is a mere consequence of the lack of an express restriction of the method of review.
193

SCHIAVI, supra note 29, at 806.
Id. at 809.
195
Novo CPC: mudanças que buscam agilizar processo entram na reta final
para sanção, supra note 34.
196
See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text (reviewing effect).
197
Barral & Machado, supra note 1, at 195.
198
NERY JUNIOR & NERY, supra note 29, at 886.
199
See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (broad adjudicatory powers
of appellate court). See Rosenn, supra note 22, at 508.
194
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Therefore, nothing in the procedural legislation bars the adoption of
standards of review.
3. Does the introduction of appellate standards of review in
Brazil require legislation change?
After assessing the utility and possibility of introducing standards of review in Brazilian civil procedure, the final issue is whether
it would require a change in the current legislation.
The answer is negative.
Since there is no constitutional or legal impediment, judges are
free to pursue a systematic interpretation that provides immediate
application to constitutional principles, such as the reasonable duration of process.200 Judges must fill the gaps of the system to ensure
full normative force these constitutional principles.201 In light of that
constitutional canon and considering the allocation of the task of
hearing witnesses at the trial level, the principle of immediacy (between the evidence and the decision-maker) requires that the assessment of the evidence by the trial judge is presumed correct.202 Additionally, procedural law allows the judge discretion as a tool to
deal with the variable factual situations that arise in a process. The
best choice for the trial court may be one, and for the appellate panel
another, despite both being correct.203 Allowing this mere divergence to cause the reversal of a reasonable decision is a waste, violating the principles of the reasonable duration of process, judicial
economy, and efficiency.204
A systematic interpretation of the Brazilian legal system, informed by the comparative law discussed in this article, leads to the
presumption of correctness of the reasonable trial court’s findings
of fact and discretionary rulings. As a result, the use of the standards

200

See supra notes 184-186 and accompanying text (judicial interpretation enforcing constitutional principles).
201
See Barroso, supra note 185 and accompanying text.
202
See supra note 181 and accompanying text (presumption of adequate credibility assessment of witnesses by trial judge).
203
See supra note 138 and accompanying text (range of correct alternatives in
a discretionary decision).
204
C.F., supra note 168, at art. 37.
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of review clearly erroneous and abuse of discretion is available even
without change in current Brazilian legislation.
Despite the possibility, however, the introduction of appellate
standards of review through judicial interpretation might initially
bring inconsistency when adopted by some appellate courts’ panels
and not by others, yielding disparate results. Such problem though,
could be solved in relatively short time with the unification of such
precedents through the edition of a súmula for that issue, which
would then be followed by the entire appellate court (and in 2016,
when the new C.P.C. comes into effect, binding also all subordinate
lower courts). A connected solution would be its inclusion in the
court’s Internal Regiment (Regimento Interno).205 Finally, though
statutory change expressly introducing standards of review is not
essential, it would be desirable, ensuring their consistent adoption,
furthering the goal of improving the efficacy of the entire system.
V.
CONCLUSION
Any change in legal culture is difficult, especially when such
change affects a long-standing feature, such as the unrestricted appellate review. However, the recognized shortcomings of that system, clogged with often trivial or meritless appeals, impose a change
in the paradigm.
Brazilian civil procedure does not limit appellate court’s powers
to review the decisions below, which are made de novo on both law
and facts. With broad reviewing powers, appellate courts tend to ignore the lower court’s decisions even when absolutely reasonable,
replacing them for the ruling they would have made if they were a
new trial court decision, and not a revision. That misconception results in a method of adjudging that inevitably increases the number
of reversals. The high rate of reversals creates excessive incentives
to appeal, making the proceedings longer, the number of appeals
higher, and the work duplicative of what have been already done at
the trial courts, overburdening the system and wasting valuable resources. It also transfers the decision power to the appellate courts—

205

Internal rules of an appellate court, which include procedural matters.
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who are not as well-positioned to assess witness credibility—and
makes it more difficult for the trial judge to enforce procedural rules.
The American standards of review are a possible solution for
these problems, promoting the efficiency of the system, with a wellbalanced allocation of power between the courts in respect to factfindings and discretionary rulings. Standards of review are the level
of deference given by the reviewing court to another tribunal ruling.
A legal error is reviewed de novo (anew) with no deference, the trial
judge’s fact-findings are not disturbed unless clearly erroneous, and
the discretionary rulings are affirmed unless there is abuse of discretion. The application of law to facts (mixed question of law and
facts) is usually reviewed de novo, except when such application is
very fact-intensive and not contributive to clarifying the legal doctrine.
The introduction of appellate standards of review in Brazilian
civil procedure would not face any impediment. They are consistent
with constitutional due process guarantees, such as the reasonable
duration of process, and with the recent statutory reforms that limit
the number and scope of appeals, and strengthen precedents. Additionally, the lack of an express statutory rule does not prevent Brazilian appellate judges from applying a more deferential standard of
review. The systematic interpretation of the Brazilian legal system,
informed by the comparative law, leads to the presumption of correctness of the reasonable trial court’s findings of fact and discretionary rulings, which should merit deference. Although the introduction of these standards through judicial interpretation might initially bring some inconsistency, their inclusion in the court’s internal regiment or the use of precedent unification tools could provide
the desired consistency. Further, statutory change limiting appellate
review would be the most desirable option, ensuring uniform adoption nationally and furthering the goal of reducing congestion and
improving the entire system.

